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Abstract
The selection and design of renewable electricity support instruments is an important part of European Union (EU) energy
policy and central to the governance of the Energy Union. In 2014, the European Commission published updated guidelines
for state aid that are driving the EU-wide implementation of auctions for allocating revenue support to commercial scale
renewable electricity generation. This article argues that the RES auction’s rapid ascent towards dominance is explained
by a coincidence of an activist interpretation of EU state aid law creating demand for knowledge about the instrument
and the emergence of a ready source of supply from a burgeoning community of a RES auction specialists and experts.
Knowledge gained through EU-wide implementation of auctions further adds to supply of auctions expertise among the
community. The implications of positive feedback between instrument demand and the growing supply of knowledge
about an instrument reinforces the importance of critical engagement between policymakers and policy experts.
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1. Introduction
Renewable energy expansion remains a public policy
goal across the European Union (EU) and global lead-
ership in renewables is a primary goal of the Clean En-
ergy Package of legislation, placing it at the heart of
the Energy Union (Szulecki, Fischer, Gullberg, & Sartor,
2016). Member States have taken various approaches
to promoting renewables, resulting in multiple national
policy instruments. The diversity of instruments used
means that public financial support for renewable elec-
tricity generation has occupied academic enquiry for
many years (del Río & Cerdá, 2014; del Río & Gual,
2004; Woodman &Mitchell, 2011). While the 1990s and
2000s saw scholars debating the relative merits of instru-
ments such as feed-in tariffs (FIT) and tradable quotas
(Mitchell, Bauknecht, & Connor, 2006), attention has re-
cently shifted to the ‘renewable electricity auction’ or re-
newable electricity support (RES) auction for achieving
policy objectives. Global experience of using auctions has
been mixed, with some encouraging examples as well as
others in which the instrument appears poorly matched
to policy goals. Of interest here is how and why such auc-
tions have rapidly assumed a prominent position in the
EU in preference to other instruments.
Our guiding question is consequently ‘how did the
auction instrument become central to EU renewable
electricity governance, given the implementation chal-
lenges’? We draw on established and emerging theories
of instrument choice, emphasising the importance of the
multi-level nature of instrument demand and the con-
cept of the ‘instrument constituency’ for promoting sup-
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ply. We then discuss the relative importance and interre-
lation between these two factors and propose theoreti-
cal refinements for future research.
We show that the auctions boom reflects changes
in the global and European policymaking context, in-
cluding the increased political salience of RES support
costs and important changes to what Howlett (2009)
calls the ‘governance mode’. Most importantly, we ob-
serve the significance of the EU’s state-aid moderni-
sation programme (SAM) in pushing the logic of pan-
European competition within RES policy making. We
also chart the emergence of a self-reinforcing commu-
nity of auction advocates fitting the description of an
‘instrument constituency’ within an emerging literature
(Béland, Howlett, & Mukherjee, 2017; Simons & Voß,
2017a, 2017b; Sturdy, 2017; Voß & Simons, 2014). This
community, we argue, plays a pivotal role in the ‘innova-
tion journey’ traversed by RES auctions.
1.1. Auctions and Renewable Energy Governance
The auction, the solicitation and ranking of bids,
has structured economic relationships since antiquity
(Krishna, 2010). The concept has been applied in a wide
range of public policy areas, including the allocation of
rights to natural resources, oil reserves and radio fre-
quency spectra (Binmore & Klemperer, 2002; Klemperer,
2004). The application of auctions as a renewable elec-
tricity governance instrument is distinct from the instru-
ments conventionally considered ‘support mechanisms’
such as FIT or tradable quotas. Renewable electricity auc-
tions tend to be characterised by two primary features.
Firstly, access to financial support is allocated to prospec-
tive electricity producers at discrete intervals in which
limited support is available. This contrastswith other sup-
port instruments such as FIT or tradable green certifi-
cates (TGC), which are, broadly, open to eligible appli-
cants at all times until the scheme is revised, for exam-
ple to account for target fulfilment. Secondly, the value
of the support, usually representing a price-supplement
per unit of production, is determined through ranking of
applicants’ price bids, with the volume of support, mea-
sured in overall cost or generation capacity, filled from
lowest price to highest. This differs from both FIT, which
offer a known fixed-price, and to TGC, the value of which
may fluctuate throughout the tenure of support (del Río,
2017; Fitch-Roy, 2016).
Thus, RES auctions, rather than acting as a support
instrument, perform an allocative function that can en-
hance policymakers’ ability to control the volume of new
renewable electricity projects, while applying a degree of
competitive pressure on bidders to offer their true costs.
In other words, the financial support awarded through
an auction is structured independently from the alloca-
tion. In practice, the most common ‘awards’ offered to
auction winners are a fixed per-unit price for production,
a very similar offer to that available through a feed-in tar-
iff (Szulecki, 2017) or a sliding premium system or ‘con-
tracts for difference’ in which payments are calculated
with reference to a market index (Fitch-Roy, 2016).
Accumulated analyses of auction performance and
subsequent refinementmean that RES auction designers
have a wealth of material to guide their decisions. Much
of the material observes (and proposes measures to cor-
rect) bidding strategies and behaviour that may lead to
sub-optimal outcomes, such as the infamous ‘winner’s
curse’ in which ex ante bids overestimate the contract
value or underestimate bidders’ costs, often making the
project undeliverable (Klemperer, 2004; Thaler, 1988).
Despite disappointing rates of project completion for
RES auctions held in the 1990s, often attributed to in-
adequate penalties for bidders making offers too low
to allow projects to proceed, (Agnolucci, 2007; del Río
& Linares, 2014; Mitchell, 1995), the RES auction has
rapidly become the predominant renewable policy in-
strument for supporting large-scale renewable electricity
generation globally. In 2005, six countries used auctions
to support renewables, by 2016 it exceeded 70 (Interna-
tional Renewable Energy Agency [IRENA], 2017). In the
EU, a 2014 update to European Commission guidelines
for interpreting state-aid law means that competitive in-
struments such as auctions are strongly preferred for all
schemes requiring state-aid notification, effectively mak-
ing auctions the default choice for member states wish-
ing to support large-scale renewable electricity deploy-
ment (European Commission, 2014).
Contemporary accounts of the recent boom in auc-
tions present them as a functional substitute for their
immediate predecessor instruments, especially the feed-
in tariff, albeit with performance enhancements (del Río,
2017; Gephart, Klessmann, &Wigand, 2017; Toke, 2015).
Observers tend to assume that the RES auction forms
part of a ‘natural’, obvious progression in the evolution
of RES support policy and that policymakers with the cor-
rect analysis, will (or at least should) tend towards their
use (International Energy Agency [IEA] & IRENA, 2017).
Prior to the recent boom in use, auctions were gen-
erally considered inferior to FIT, both in their effective-
ness at generating renewables growth and driving inno-
vation, as well as in their cost effectiveness (Butler &
Neuhoff, 2008). Economic theory invoked in support of
RES auctions (del Río & Linares, 2014) is also ambiguous.
Martin Weitzman’s seminal (1974) essay suggests that
quantity-control instruments (such as auctions) should,
under conditions of uncertainty, offer welfare benefits
over price instruments (such as feed in tariffs) where
supply curves are flat relative to demand. The actual
shape of these curves for renewable electricity, how-
ever, is highly variable and strongly dependent on lo-
cal resources and supply-chain conditions, not indicat-
ing a generalised application of auctions (Held, 2010).
Transaction-cost economics paints a similarly ambiguous
picture about the universal suitability of RES auctions as
governance instruments (Finon & Perez, 2007; Kitzing,
Mitchell, & Morthorst, 2012). Nevertheless, the Euro-
pean Commission’s 2014 guidelines for state-aid amount
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to an immediate, mandatory, and EU-wide application of
auctions to the support of large-scale renewable electric-
ity projects, to the initial alarm of many stakeholders (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2013).
This article is primarily inspired by our observation
that the RES auctionwas rehabilitatedwithinmainstream
European policymaking remarkably quickly. The gener-
ally accepted explanation of its rapid uptake rests on
the auction’s supposed ability to simultaneously enable
static efficiency (i.e., improve cost-effectiveness) and
increase market integration, while controlling the vol-
ume of deployment and total support payments (IRENA,
2017). With a few notable recent cases of faster-than-
anticipated deployment of renewables and associated
support costs under feed-in systems (Inderberg, Tews, &
Turner, 2018; Mir-Artigues, Cerdá, & del Río, 2018) and
continuing reductions in contract prices achieved at auc-
tion (Mora et al., 2017), this explanation is prima facie
credible. However, this accepted ‘functionalist’ explana-
tion of the rise of renewable electricity auctions, we ar-
gue, cannot fully account for the auction’s rapid ascent
to becoming the main RES instrument in the EU.
RES support instruments encompass a huge range of
diversity and the objectives set for the instrument (ex-
plicit or implicit) also vary widely between locations and
over time, going far beyond the basic “cost efficiency”
rationale (del Río & Linares, 2014; Winkler, Magosch, &
Ragwitz, 2018). Often, the fundamental renewable en-
ergy policy goals remain to (continue to) deploy renew-
able electricity within a wider transformation towards
a low-carbon economy. We hold that the EU-wide in-
troduction of the auction is a significant, complex and
somewhat surprising change to goal realisation, thereby
requiring better explanation. Given the propensity for
EU climate and energy governance choices to shape pol-
icy elsewhere (and vice-versa) throughmechanisms such
as international policy diffusion or transfer, the rise of
the EU RES auction has global significance (Inderberg,
Bailey, & Harmer, 2017;Meckling, 2011). This article con-
tributes to a clearer understanding of the mechanisms
involved in such propagation.
The inspiration for this documentary study arises
from two of the authors’ participation as researchers in
the AURES project, funded under the European Commis-
sion’s Horizon 2020 programme to develop and dissem-
inate expertise in RES auction design between January
2014 and December 2017. The authors were simultane-
ously working to create knowledge useful to policy prac-
titioners seeking to solve problems related to the design
of RES auctions and subsequently reflecting on that ex-
perience to posemore general questions such as that ad-
dressed in this paper. In this regard, the study draws on a
research strategy loosely aligned with a tradition of par-
ticipatory action research in public policy and organisa-
tions (Heatwole, Keller, & Wamsley, 1976; Whyte, 1991).
Participation in the project did not result in direct
or indirect observation of other project participants as
research subjects (Johnson & Reynolds, 2012). It did,
however, trigger and inform the subsequent documen-
tary analysis which provides the empirical data on which
this study is based. All elements of the account are sup-
ported by (we hope compelling) documentary evidence,
although we acknowledge that the experience of the
authors inevitably brings a certain degree of interpreta-
tion in the selection and presentation of data. We have
made every effort, however, to ensure that the account
is “clear enough to be proven wrong” (Sabatier, 2007,
p. 5) and invite other authors to do exactly that.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows:
section 2 describes our analytical framework, distinguish-
ing between demand for and supply of knowledge about
governance instruments; section 3 deploys the frame-
work to present an account of the rise of the RES auction
in the EU; section 4 discusses the implications of the ac-
count and concludes.
2. Conceptualising Demand for And Supply of New
Governance Instruments
As set out in the introduction, this paper starts from the
assertion that a purely functional explanation of the as-
cent of the RES auction cannot account for the rapidity
or scope of the policy change observed. In search of a
more satisfactory explanation, this section develops an
analytical framework that considers firstly the ‘demand’
for instrument change, which may take the form of ex-
ogenous economic or political developments. We briefly
discuss some of the constraints on instrument selection
that limit responsiveness to demand. Secondly we draw
on recent work highlighting the significance of instru-
ment ‘supply’. That is, the networks of knowledge and ex-
pertise required to firstly select and secondly implement
changes to instruments.
In the first instance, we reject the idea that gover-
nance instruments, the means by which “governments
shape behaviour in pursuit of its policies” (Hood & Mar-
getts, 2007, p. xiii), are neutral tools that policymakers
may simply pick up and ‘use’ to solve particular policy
problems. Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007, p. 2) state that
public policy instrument choice is often considered part
of a “rationality of methods” with no inherent meaning.
This rational “functionalist orientation” is attractive since
it assumes that rationality is, or normatively should be,
the basis of instrument choice (for example, Hepburn,
2006). But instrument choice is not a straightforward à
la carte selection. Instead, it is greatly influenced by, and
has influence on, contextual, historical and sociological
factors. Instruments themselves firstly represent a con-
densed and particular form of knowledge about how to
govern social processes and, secondly, induce specific ef-
fects outside the objectives set for them that “structure
public policy according to their own logic” (Lascoumes &
Le Gales, 2007, p. 3; Simons & Voß, 2017b).
Literature addressing the choice of policy instrument
reflects two broad branches. The first helps to under-
stand the demand for types of instrument in particular
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contexts and particular timeswhile the second addresses
the supply of instruments available tomeet that demand.
We anticipate that supply and demand processes are
dynamic and interactive, with changes on the supply-
side influencing demand for an instrument as well as
vice-versa.
2.1. Demand for New Instruments
In addition to the practical, administrative constraints
that influence instrument choice (can it and will it
achieve its material aims?), the multi-level, nested na-
ture of policy goals and actions sharply constrains the
types of instrument thatmay be implemented in a partic-
ular context (Howlett, 2009). The ultimate choice of pol-
icy target and the tools used to reach them reflect not
simply the aims of the policy area, but also wider poli-
cymaking and political contexts. New instrument adop-
tion is not simply putting a ‘new nib on an old pen’.
As tools of governance, instruments must be coherent
with the current “governance mode” or fairly stable sets
of “favoured ideas and instruments” as well as with
the objectives and preferences of the intermediate level
“policy regime” in which public policy choices are de-
termined (Howlett, 2009, p. 76). Consequently, change
within these higher levels of abstraction, such as the
fundamental governance arrangements of the economy
or the broad policy objectives or logics, may create de-
mand for change at the instrument level. This demand
for new or updated instruments may not directly reflect
the immediate goals, preferences and norms or “on-the-
ground micro-requirement” of the policy targets that re-
quire specific tool calibrations (Howlett, 2009, p. 75).
Considering instrument choice as a governance pro-
cess that takes place across multiple levels of abstrac-
tion highlights particular challenges for instrument choice
in the EU. If we consider that EU governance takes the
form of a multi-level “system of continuous negotiation”
among various interdependent territorial levels, achiev-
ing coherence between levels, between policies and
instruments becomes more complex again (Hooghe &
Marks, 2001; Marks, 1993, p. 392). Changes in the policy-
making regimeor governancemode at the European level
may conflict with those at the national level, potentially
(but not necessarily) further constraining national instru-
ment choices (Jordan, Wurzel, Zito, & Bruckner, 2003).
2.2. Supply of New Instruments
Recent theoretical developments have brought the
supply-side of policy change into sharper focus. The no-
tion that the policy subsystem is structured into iden-
tifiable actor groups engaged in complex interactions,
collaborating and competing to define problems while
searching for and legitimising solutions has a long her-
itage (Haas, 1992; Kingdon, 2010; Sabatier & Jenkins-
Smith, 1993). More recent policy analysis is showing the
importance of specialist ‘instrument constituencies’ in
creating and sustaining a ‘supply-push’ for particular in-
strumental forms of governance (Simons & Voß, 2017b).
Instrument constituencies help to understand how
particular models of governance ‘take on a life of their
own’. As a particular governance instrument develops,
knowledge of its functional particularities grows, atten-
dant business opportunities emerge and political agen-
das are shaped such that a constituency of specialist ac-
tors “come to live through and for the development of a
specific governance instrument” (Simons & Voß, 2017b,
p. 2). It is posited that instruments take on a ‘social life’
within the instrument constituency, lived through prac-
tices such as: “scientific theory building, data production
and publishing, political issue framing, agenda setting,
coalition building, business development, marketing and
lobbying, management of innovation networks, profes-
sional organisation” (Voß & Simons, 2014, p. 737).
Among propositions made in the nascent literature
on instrument communities is an expectation that they
are fundamentally future-facing structures in which ac-
tors “align their agency towards the development, reten-
tion, and expansion of the instrument” (Simons & Voß,
2017b, p. 6). Members of the instrument constituency
may work simultaneously on specific implementations
and the generic, conceptual articulation and refinement
of the instrument to encourage its take-up and imple-
mentation elsewhere. The instrument constituency is
central to a cycle of mutual reinforcement between im-
plementation and an ever-more refined conceptual un-
derstanding of the instrument held in the model used to
support further implementations (Simons & Voß, 2017b;
Voß & Simons, 2014).
While the instrument constituency concept remains
relatively new, there are early indications of its useful-
ness in explaining instrument choices in multiple policy
fields (see Simons & Voß, 2017a). Of particular relevance
to this article are the insights afforded by the instrument
constituency into the expansionary ‘innovation journey’
of EU climate and energy policy instruments such as the
EU Emissions Trading System (Voß, 2007; Voß & Simons,
2014). The implication here is that not only will the sup-
ply of specialist knowledge grow in response to demand,
but that the level of demand will, in turn, be influenced
by growing supply.
3. A Brief History of a Policy Boom
Following the generally unsatisfactory performance of
auctions to realise new projects in Ireland, the UK and
France in the 1990s, a decade-long hiatus occurred in
their use for allocating RES support (Agnolucci, 2007; del
Río & Linares, 2014; Mitchell, 1995). In the last decade,
however, a new wave of RES auctions began, largely
focussed on developing nations (Azuela et al., 2014;
IRENA, 2017; Winkler et al., 2018). In countries such as
Brazil, South Africa, China and India, policymakers faced
with surging demand for new electricity capacity began
to hold periodic tenders in which renewable electricity
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projects could receive power purchase agreement (PPA)
contracts (Baker, Newell, & Phillips, 2014; IRENA, 2013).
The use of RES auctions in developing nations is
based in the logic of state procurement (Lucas, del Río,
& Youba Sokona, 2017). State procurement of renewable
capacity leads to auction usage for two reasons. Firstly,
the use of auctions in other areas of electricity policy has
been awidespread procurement tool, often for outsourc-
ing electricity production by public distribution compa-
nies to private producers. The extension into RES pro-
curement was uncontroversial (Maurer & Barroso, 2011).
Secondly, RES auctions, as ‘competitive’ instruments, are
highly compatible with multilateral organisations’ strict
guidelines for procurement supportedwith donor capital
(Ravallion, 2016), itself an artefact of the neoliberal pref-
erences of many global institutions (Newell & Phillips,
2016; Ockwell et al., 2017). This complementarity means
that auctions are a common requirement for developing
nations in implementing renewable electricity procure-
ment programmes reliant on this support (Eberhard &
Naude, 2016).
African and SouthAmerican countries, including Zam-
bia, Ethiopia, Argentina and Uganda, utilise RES auction
policies, often supported by multilateral finance. These
cases are held by policymakers, academics and others
as examples of successful RES auctions and used to
recommend greater application of auctions for energy
policy (Eberhard & Naude, 2016; International Finance
Corporation [IFC], 2017; Lucas et al., 2017; Maurer &
Barroso, 2011). These early experiences of RES procure-
ment through auctions, although far from universally
positive (Azuela et al., 2014), led to the enumeration
of RES auction ‘best practices’. Multilateral developmen-
tal organisations, such as the World Bank (WB) and IFC,
began formalising and deploying these lessons in many
countries (Maurer & Barroso, 2011).
Alongside the collation and dissemination of RES
auction knowledge by development organisations them-
selves, key players in the energy scene such as the IEA
and IRENA began to build competence in auction de-
sign and implementation (IRENA, 2013). They were sup-
ported by a network of consultancies and research insti-
tutes in Europe, mainly in Germany and Denmark. This
group is well regarded for its track record of expertise in
analysing and designing renewable electricity policy sup-
port instruments on behalf of international donor organi-
sations plus national and European policymakers through
programmes such as Horizon 2020 (de Jager&Rathmann,
2008; GTZ, 2009; Ragwitz et al., 2007). By 2013, interna-
tional RES auction experiencewas being distilled into firm
advice for policy as this expert group found new clients in
the development sector willing to fund reports for recip-
ient countries, such as South Africa (Ecofys, 2013).
Before 2014, very few EU member states had exper-
imented with RES auctions (del Río & Linares, 2014). Ex-
perience of auctioning support for multiple, privately de-
veloped projects, in the UK, Ireland and France, was char-
acterised by poor project completion (del Río & Linares,
2014). However, the combination of administratively set
FIT and falling equipment pricing led to surging growth
in installation, escalating policy costs, the over-rewarding
of producers and associated budgetary challenges. Con-
sequently, RES support in feed-in tariff countries such
as Germany and Spain became politically salient (Geels,
Sovacool, Schwanen,& Sorrell, 2017;Mir-Artigues, Cerdá,
& del Río, 2015). Nevertheless, by 2014 few EU member
states (the UK being a notable exception, see Fitch-Roy &
Woodman, 2016) had identified RES auctions as a viable
candidate for primary large-scale RES instrument.
In 2014, the European Commission published revised
guidelines against for evaluating RES instrument compli-
ance with state-aid rules. The energy and environmen-
tal aid guidelines (EEAG), the Commission’s official in-
terpretation of the prohibition of state-aid under article
107(1) of the TFEU, require that, from 2017, member
states offering support to renewable generators (except
micro projects or novel technologies), are required to use
“instruments, such as auctioning or competitive bidding
process[es]”. The reasoning for the blanket requirement
is the prediction of lower costs and internal market com-
patibility (European Commission, 2014). Although EEAG
is not the only factor creating demand for new auctions
schemes in Europe (Leiren & Reimer, 2018), it was a sig-
nificant driver of auction adoption.
Adoption of the EEAG reflects broader trends in EU
state aid law. Since 2001, Commission guidelines have
acknowledged concerns about balancing environmental
protection and compatibility of member state policy to-
wards renewable energy with the single market. In 2001,
a dispute involving the utility company, Preussen Elektra,
over the legality of German FIT under EU competition
law, was resolved by the ECJ, the court finding that,
since revenues were not drawn from state resources,
FIT did not constitute state aid (Kuhn, 2001). This le-
gal precedent contributed to rapid growth in the use of
the FIT across Europe. From a RES perspective, state-aid
rules and renewable energy policy have since been kept
broadly separate, despite ongoing monitoring and as-
sessment of national renewable aid scheme compliance.
However, since 2005 a ‘quiet revolution’ in EU state-
aid law has seen the expanded application of economic,
rather than purely legal, principles for determining the
Commission’s interpretation of the Treaty’s state-aid pro-
hibition (Hancher, 2005, p. 431). This process of expan-
sion towards the use of state-aid law in pursuit of broader
public policy goals has been guided by a programme of
State Aid Modernisation (SAM; Verouden, 2015). Here,
the EEAG marks a clear shift towards state aid as “a reg-
ulatory and policy making tool rather than a mere moni-
toring and law enforcement tool” (Jansen, 2016, p. 597;
Koenig, 2014). Not only are the legal principles of state
aid compliance for RES support laid out, but the eco-
nomic rationale and policy design in the form of auctions
is also specified (Salerno, Douguet, & Rious, 2018).
This expansion of the Commission’s interpretation of
EU Treaty article 107 to include policy objectives other
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than strict legal compliance has significantly strength-
ened European Commission competence. It also reflects
a distinct internal shift of power over RES policy within
the European Commission from the Energy Directorate
General (DG Energy, formerly DG TREN) to DG Compe-
tition, something that had been sought for some time.
For example, attempts by DG Competition in 2008 to en-
sure that DG TREN’s proposals for the Renewable Energy
Directive included an EU-wide tradable quota scheme
resulted in a well-documented failure (Jacobsson et al.,
2009; Nilsson, Nilsson, & Ericsson, 2009).
Following the EEAG in 2014, RES auction design and
implementation swept across Europe, with 13 Member
States implementing RES auctions by 2018 and a further
five with firm plans in place (Council of European Energy
Regulators [CEER], 2018), creating strong demand for
analysis and practical advice, largely met by the RES com-
munity of support specialists and supranational organi-
sations such as CEER. To assist national governments, ad-
vocacy organisations with an EU climate and energy pol-
icy remit commissioned reports detailing key challenges
of using RES auctions in Europe (Agora Energiewende,
2014). The European Commission concurrently engaged
a consortium of RES support experts through its Hori-
zon 2020 programme to undertake a three-year knowl-
edge creation and dissemination project to increase un-
derstanding of RES auctions and contribute to the EU pol-
icy process (Kitzing et al., 2016; Mora et al., 2017).
Despite some high-profile successes, EU experience
does not show a universal trend of auctions outper-
forming other financial support mechanisms to renew-
able electricity generators (Winkler et al., 2018). Indeed,
there have been some notable failures of auctions to ful-
fil objectives formerlymet with FIT (del Río, 2017). In par-
ticular, preventing participants from bidding at prices be-
low the cost of realisation (and therefore not delivering),
and fostering technology, participant and geographical
diversity have all proved challenging. In addition, pursu-
ing multiple policy goals, beyond lowest cost contracts,
has presented challenges. Less mature technologies and
smaller, community-based participants have proved es-
pecially difficult to target (Stratmann, 2017). Price re-
ductions achieved with auctions are neither universal
nor necessarily persistent, often resulting in slowing
RES deployment (Huebler, Radov, & Wieshammer, 2017;
Winkler et al., 2018). It is, however, ‘early days’ and ad-
ministrators’ understanding of auction effectiveness is
building. Widespread application of the instrument is
credited with reducing technology prices and expanding
renewable electricity installations (IRENA, 2017). The ex-
pertise for such learning is provided by researchers inte-
gratedwith the network of specialists identified above as
being involved in consolidating knowledge from develop-
ing countries as well as renewable energy support instru-
ments more generally.
With the RES auction established in Europe, new in-
ternational horizons are emerging. The auctioning idea,
refined in Germany and other member states after the
EEAG, is being widely promoted across various interna-
tional fora and between EU members, such as France
and Germany (Ragwitz & Anatolitis, 2017). In hosting
the 2017 G20 summit, for example, Germany convened
a series of climate and energy-focussed activities sup-
ported with analysis from actors such as IRENA and
the IEA as well as the network of research and consul-
tancy organisations (Ecofys, 2016). The resultant com-
muniqué presents auctions as an uncontroversial instru-
ment choice, stating that:
[Renewable energy] policy instruments have evolved
and in some cases consolidated around standardmod-
els. An example is the evolution of renewable elec-
tricity support schemes in a number of countries
from portfolio standards and feed-in-tariffs to auc-
tions. (IEA & IRENA, 2017, p. 32)
New regions such as South East Asia have been identi-
fied as ripe for the auction treatment, with the same co-
hort advising donor organisations such as USAID and pol-
icymakers in Asia (Ecofys, 2017; Tongsopit et al., 2017).
Auctions are also promoted across the EU’s Energy Com-
munity neighbourhood (Wigand & Amazo, 2017).
4. Discussion and Conclusions
This article aimed to explain how RES auctions became
central to EU renewable energy governance so rapidly.
The narrative shows four key stages in RES auctions inno-
vation. First, auctionswere used as a procurement tool in
developing countries where donor organisations and de-
velopment banks were central to establishing a supply of
expertise in how to use auctions to allocate RES contracts.
Second, RES auctions fulfil DG Competition’s preference
for a competitive, potentially pan-European support pol-
icy. The rise of state-aid policy as the main driver of EU
RES policy marks a distinct shift in governance mode, a
crucial factor in creating demand for new instruments
(Howlett, 2009). EU state-aid modernisation, combined
with examples of budgetary difficulties with FIT, allowed
DGCompetition to not only enforce state-aid compliance
but to effectively mandate the type of instrument mem-
ber states could use. Thirdly, the 2014 EEAG created a
laboratory of member state cases for fine-tuning RES
auctions. Implementation has provided important data
about how best to overcome challenges, enhancing the
supply of auctions expertise held by a growing instru-
ment constituency. Finally, the lessons learned first in
developing countries, and in Europe, are being reflected
in new regions, setting up an additional wave of interna-
tional propagation.
A community of auction experts has accompanied
the RES auction on its journey. Academic institutions
and consultancies have helped develop, collate, inter-
pret and conceptualise RES auctions. Much of the intel-
lectual effort builds on collaboration established in ear-
lier research programmes. But, whether this community
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constitutes the hypothesised ‘instrument constituency’
depends on whether its activities have been expansion-
ary in that actors have sought, consciously or otherwise,
greater implementation of RES auctions as an end rather
that a means to an end. We argue that this has oc-
curred. Consultants with demonstrable design expertise
gained in developing countries found their skills in high
demand across Europe due to the EEAG. The European
Commission, by funding further research by the same
group bought legitimacy that ‘it could be done’ while
honing the instrument for further expansion. Interna-
tional organisations such as IRENA and national govern-
ments, once auctions were the ‘only game in town’, fed
this process by procuring further analysis. We do not as-
sert that these actors actively sought to promote auc-
tions at the expense of alternatives. Between 2007 and
2014, renewable energy policy costs were salient in Eu-
rope, and talk of auctions was ‘in the air’. We also ac-
knowledge that some contemporary research in transi-
tions and economics suggests that quantity-control in-
struments such as auctions may becomemore prevalent
as renewable energy markets mature (Kitzing, Fitch-Roy,
Islam, & Mitchell, 2019).
However, we argue above that demand-side eco-
nomic and political factors do not fully explain the ra-
pidity with which the RES auction has displaced earlier
instruments, often leading to diminished performance
against goals (Winkler et al., 2018). While it is clear that
there was demand for change, our account strongly sug-
gests that those demand signals were amplified through
mutual reinforcement between policymakers and ana-
lysts making the most of the competitive advantage af-
forded by their auctions expertise. Positive feedback be-
tween auction experts seeking newmarkets and new on-
the-ground problem-solving experience enhanced this
expertise, accelerating refinement and innovation in auc-
tion conceptualisation and design.
The spread of auctions suggests a degree of interna-
tional convergence in RES governance, either through dif-
fusion or by policy transfer (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996).
The agency implied here in propagating RES auctions
firstly between developing nations and the EU and sec-
ondly outwards to Europe’s near neighbours suggests
that the instrument constituency contributes to policy
transfer, rather than policy diffusion, a more structural
phenomenon (Marsh & Sharman, 2009).
The observed trajectory of RES auctions described
shows a distinct parallel to Voβ and Simons’ (2014) ac-
count of the Emission Trading System instrument con-
stituency in which the EU was a key staging post in
the governance innovation journey. The lessons learned
through the EU￿ETS continue to inform the design of
trading systems around theworld (Inderberg et al., 2017).
In much the same way, RES auctions were of peripheral
interest until the scale of innovation and demand for in-
strument knowledge that can occur in an EU-wide im-
plementation was realised. Viewing instrument choices
through the lens proposed here may offer insights for
analysts and policymakers. That instrument choice is ini-
tially shaped by changes to governance principles result-
ing fromdevelopments outside the policy area and there-
after by positive feedback within an instrument con-
stituency provides policymakers with important knowl-
edge. While demand-side pressures such as the growing
tendency to use state-aid as a policy tool is ongoing and
inevitable, the active role of policymakers on the supply-
side of instrument innovation demands greater reflec-
tion. As Voβ and Simons’ (2014) acknowledge, the self-
fulfilling nature of instrument innovation reinforces the
need for scrutiny of instrument choice, recognising that
not all policy innovations are created equal. Apparent
consensus around an instrument may reflect the state of
supply of specialist instrument knowledge as well as the
instrument’s functional properties.
Finally, the importance and relevance of the concept
of the instrument constituency may vary between pol-
icy areas and between different policymaking contexts.
The degree of EU competence and therefore Europe-
wide policy research coordinationmay be a critical factor.
A comparative research agenda can help clarify these is-
sues. Also, while there is growing recognition of how in-
strument constituencies complement theories of policy
making such as themultiple streams approach (Fitch-Roy,
Benson, & Mitchell, 2018; Mukherjee & Howlett, 2015)
and advocacy coalition framework (Weible, 2017), sim-
ilar engagement with new institutionalist research, dis-
cursive institutionalism in particular (Fitch-Roy, Fairbrass
and Benson, 2019), could offer benefits to both fields.
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